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ABSTRACT
Alan Wertheimer argues that before we promulgate some rule regarding
the conduct of research on human subjects we ethically ought to consider
the consequences of the rule being followed. This ethical requirement has
an exception, though, Wertheimer maintains: it doesn’t apply to rules that
are not motivated by considerations of outcome. I agree that there is an ex-
ception to be made toWertheimer’s proposed ethical requirement, but not
Wertheimer’s exception.The important distinction is not that between rules
motivated by considerations of outcome and rulesmotivated otherwise, but
between rules designed to enforce ethics and rules not so designed. Before
we promulgate the latter kind of rule, we are ethically required to consider
the consequences of doing so.This is not so for the former kind of rule. My
exception, unlike Wertheimer’s, yields the conclusion that we should pro-
mulgate, regardless of the consequences of doing so, a rule requiring that
the potential benefit to the subject of participation in a study outweigh the
risks. This rule ismotivated by considerations of outcome, so it would land
on the wrong side of Wertheimer’s divide. But it’s also designed to enforce
ethics, so it lands on the correct side of my divide.
KEYWORDS: Research ethics, regulation, promulgations, standard of care,
incentives
Moral philosophy suffered a great loss when Alan Wertheimer passed away earlier
this year, as the legions of people familiar with his excellent work on coercion, exploita-
tion, and consent will attest. Perhaps less well-known is that at the end of his career,
when he turned his attention to human subjects research, Alan devoted his time to say-
ing some unpopular things that absolutely needed to be said. (He was certainly doing
so in the article to which I’m responding here.) On a personal note, Alan was a kind,
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2  Two kinds of rule regulating human subjects research
generous mentor to me, and I learned a great deal from our discussions. He was always
up for a lively give and take; so in that spirit, on we go.
Various organizations, such as the World Medical Organization and CIOMS, have
taken it upon themselves to publish rules for the conduct of medical research on hu-
man subjects. Although these rules don’t have the force of law—at least not directly—
they’re quite influential. And so, Alan Wertheimer argues in a recent article that the
bodies issuing these rules, ormaking these ‘promulgations’ aswemight say, should con-
sider the consequences of their doing so when doing so.1
I argue here thatWertheimermakes one serious falsemove in defending his conclu-
sion. Ultimately I want to showhow the flaw can be fixed, and in away thatWertheimer
has no strong reason to resist. First, however, I briefly recapitulate Wertheimer’s
argument. Then I then take a closer look at a crucial part of that argument, in which
Wertheimer tries, unsuccessfully in my view, to block a likely objection.
Wertheimer’s conclusion, that the consequences of rule-promulgation in the area
of human subjects research should be taken into account, is a generalization from four
cases, each of them an already-promulgated rule. For each case,Wertheimer provides a
plausible story as to howpromulgating such a rule could yield bad consequences for the
research subjects themselves or the broader community—the very entities the promul-
gationof the rules is supposed tobenefit.2 I’ll summarizehere eachof the four examples:
TheResponsivenessPrinciple: Studies conducted in low- andmiddle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) ‘should be responsive to the health needs of the host country’.3
Wertheimer points out that promulgating this rule could lead to some studies that
would otherwise have been conducted in developing countries being either not con-
ducted or moved to a developed country. He invites the reader to imagine that a phar-
maceutical company wants to conduct a study, in Uganda, of a new hypertension drug
against an existing drug. If hypertension isn’t a health priority inUganda, as it seems not
to be, thenTheResponsiveness Principle rules out conducting this study. But the study
not being conducted inUgandawould be bad for the potential Ugandan subjects, since
they actually do suffer hypertension.
Standard of Care: A new intervention may not be tested ‘against a placebo when
proven effective treatment is available unless, perhaps, a placebo-controlled trial is nec-
essary to generate the relevant scientific information and there is little risk to the subject
in not receiving the intervention’.4
Wertheimernotes that in response to theStandardofCare rule, study sponsors have,
in the past, changed their plan regarding where to site a planned study. This can have,
and has had, serious negative consequences for the people who would have had the
opportunity to serve as research subjects if the plan had not been changed.
Post-Trial Treatment: A study may not be conducted ‘if there is good reason to be-
lieve that a product developed or knowledge generated by [the study] is unlikely to be
1 Alan Wertheimer,The Ethics of Promulgating Principles of Research Ethics: The Problem of Diversion Effects, 2 J.
L. & BIOSCI. 2 (2015).
2 Id. at 28.
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 16.
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reasonably available to, or applied to the benefit of, the population of a host country or
community after the conclusion of the research’.5
Wertheimer points out that there will often be a cost associated with abiding by the
Post-Trial Treatment rule.This extra cost could render unaffordable some studies that
would otherwise be affordable, thereby depriving the world of the benefit of the knowl-
edge it would have generated and depriving thewould-be study subjects of any benefits
they would have gained by participating. Moreover, it could cause some studies to be
conducted in developed countries that would otherwise have been conducted in de-
veloping countries, since in developed countries the national health service might pick
up the cost of providing the population access to the newly proven health intervention.
This is unfortunate, since there is more good to be done in developing countries.
Ancillary Care: A study may not be conducted unless ancillary care is provided to
the study subjects.
Ancillary care is treatment “‘beyond what is necessary to implement a study’s de-
sign safely and validly” and is also beyond any (contractual) treatments that investi-
gators may offer in order to recruit and enroll a sufficient number of participants’.6
Wertheimer points out that providing ancillary care comes at a cost and therefore could
lead to an otherwise affordable study becoming unaffordable, thereby depriving the
world of the knowledge that would otherwise have been gained. And, again, it could
also lead to a study being sited in a place where potential subjects already have good
health care, since this would entail there being less ancillary care to provide.
Because his worries about the four rules listed above each stem from a concern that
the good consequences of potential studies not be lost out on, Wertheimer anticipates
that he might be criticized as simply assuming a consequentialist framework for assess-
ing the validity of rules regarding human subjects research.7 In response, he points out
that one cannot validly infer consequentialism from theprinciples towhichhe appealed
in raising worries about the four rules. Wertheimer furthermore goes on endorse the
idea that there are two rules that researchers should followevenwhen the consequences
of doing so are bad overall, rules I will label ‘Informed Consent’ and ‘Overall Benefit’.
Informed Consent: A person may not be enrolled as a subject without his/her in-
formed consent.
Overall Benefit:A person may not be enrolled as a subject unless the potential ben-
efits to him/her outweigh the potential harms to him/her.
This is a fair response, but of course the fact remains that Wertheimer’s criticisms
of the promulgation of the four rules (as I will henceforth collectively refer toThe Re-
sponsiveness Principle, Standard of Care, Post-Trial Treatment, and Ancillary Care)
are consequence-based. This invites the question of what makes the promulgation of
some rules, including (apparently) the four rules, liable to consequence-based criti-
cism, and the promulgation of other rules, including (apparently) Informed Consent
and Overall Benefit, immune.
Wertheimer is aware of this worry as well. He points out that each of the four rules
is motivated by a concern for a certain sort of consequence: the well-being of individ-
uals. So criticizing the promulgation of those rules for possibly causing individuals to
5 Id. at 18.
6 Id. at 21, quoting Richardson and Belsky.
7 Id. at 28.
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4  Two kinds of rule regulating human subjects research
enjoy less well-being constitutes criticizing them on grounds of possibly violating the
very principle that motivates them. Another way to put this is thatWertheimer’s criticism
of the promulgation of each of the four rules is an internal criticism.
So far, so good. However, the natural question to ask next is whether the promul-
gation of Informed Consent or Overall Benefit might be liable, on the same grounds,
to consequence-based criticism. Seemingly anticipating this move as well, Wertheimer
points out that Informed Consent has a deontological form. This may be his way of
saying that criticizing the promulgation of Informed Consent on grounds of possibly
leading to bad consequences would not qualify as lodging an internal criticism. What
Wertheimer doesn’t address is whether the promulgation of Overall Benefit is liable to
consequence-based criticism. He clearly believes that it isn’t, yet the fact remains that
it does seem liable to one. The most obvious defense of promulgating Overall Bene-
fit is that doing so works to the benefit of actual and potential study subjects. This is a
consequence-based defense, and so criticizing the promulgation of Overall Benefit for
possibly leading to bad consequences would constitute lodging an internal criticism.
Moreover, such a criticism would be rather compelling: What if, as seems likely, hold-
ing human subjects research to an Overall Benefit rule causes some studies that would
otherwise have been conducted to not be conducted?This being the case, the world is
thereby deprived of the knowledge that those studies would have generated. This is a
bad consequence.
This leaves Wertheimer in a pickle. It appears he must either (a) insist that some-
times it isn’t legitimate to criticize consequence-based rule-promulgations on grounds
of possibly leading to bad consequences, (b) argue that the promulgation of Overall
Benefit is not consequence-based, or (c) admit that whether we should promulgate
Overall Benefit depends on the likely consequences of doing so, as is the case (accord-
ing toWertheimer) with the four rules.
I assume thatWertheimerwouldn’t bewilling to take anyof these threeoptions. For-
tunately, the trilemma is only apparent. If Wertheimer were willing to change slightly
his criticism of the promulgation of the four rules, then he could stand by those criti-
cisms and also his endorsement of Overall Benefit. I turn now to showing how that can
be done.
I begin by calling attention to howWertheimer initially motivates his claim that we
should attend to the consequences of promulgating a rule before promulgating it. He
does so by bringing forward four examples of rules outside the domain of human sub-
jects research—rules for which it is uncontroversial, or at least less controversial, that
we should attend to consequences when deciding whether to promulgate them. They
are as follows.
i. Establishing a speed limit on a highway.8
ii. Requiring that small children traveling on planes be put in a child safety seat.9
iii. Changing the tax on cigarettes.10
iv. Changing the rate of income tax to which high earners are subject.11
8 Id. at 2.
9 Id. at 3.
10 Id. at 4.
11 Id. at 5.
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Two kinds of rule regulating human subjects research  5
I submit that one feature each of these rules has in common is that its purpose is not
the enforcement of ethics.There is no ethical fact of thematter as to what speed people
should drive on the highway—or at least no uniform fact that a speed limit law could
enact. And it’s probably not unethical—that would be awfully harsh—for a parent not
to put his/her small child in a safety seat when traveling by plane. Similarly, there is no
ethical fact of the matter as to what the tax on cigarettes should be. That is, unless we
can make an argument that tax revenue on cigarettes are what smokers morally owe to
the rest of the population for driving up health care costs; Wertheimer, however, cites
asmotivations for a cigarette tax reducing the number of people who smoke and raising
revenue. By contrast, theremay be an ethical fact of thematter as towhat rate of income
tax high earners should pay, but enforcing that obligation is probably not the purpose of
the income tax—i.e. it isn’t why we have one. And Wertheimer makes no reference to
that motive in his discussion of the income tax; he simply alludes to the state’s need for
revenue.
With that premise laid out, I want to suggest a first move forWertheimer tomake by
way of extricating himself from the trilemma in which we left him.
First Move: Claim that the purpose of The Four Rules is, likewise, not the enforce-
ment of ethics.
Admittedly, Wertheimer clearly doesn’t want to say this.12 But if he did say this, he
could then, without any inconsistency (as I will argue below), make this second move.
SecondMove:Claim that promulgatingOverall Benefit does have the purpose of en-
forcing ethics.
Having made these two moves, Wertheimer could proceed to thisThirdMove.
Third Move: Maintain that when it comes to promulgating rules that are not de-
signed to enforce ethics,we are ethically required to take into account the consequences
of doing so.
I’ve argued for this claim elsewhere,13 in the service of defending the same conclu-
sion at which Wertheimer arrives: with respect to some rules regarding the conduct of
human subjects research (not, for instance, Informed Consent and Overall Benefit),
organizations should take into account the consequences of promulgating those rules
before doing so. Wertheimer himself would have no problem with making this move,
and when combined with the first move it getsWertheimer to the conclusion he wants
to reachwith respect to the four rules.WhereWertheimer and I depart, however, is that
I believe (and will argue below) that Wertheimer should make this fourth move.
FourthMove: Insist that when it comes to promulgating rules that are designed to
enforce ethics, we are not ethically required to take account of the consequences of
doing so.
This, combined with the second move would get Wertheimer to the conclusion he
wants to reach regarding Overall Benefit, namely that ethics does not require that we
take account of the consequences of promulgating it.
12 He portrays organizations like theWMA andCIOMS as being in the business of promulgating ethical rules for
the conduct of human subjects research, and he concludes his article by saying that such bodies should attend
to ‘the ethics of promulgating the ethics of conducting research’ (Id. at 32, emphasis mine).
13 Benjamin Sachs,The Case for Evidence-Based Rulemaking in Human Subjects Research, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3
(2010).
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6  Two kinds of rule regulating human subjects research
I don’t have the space here to argue thoroughly for my claim that there is no incon-
sistency in making the First and SecondMoves. But let me say two things.
First, Overall Benefit follows directly from the principle of Beneficence, one of the
canonical principles of bioethics (the others being Respect for Persons and Justice).
By contrast, none of the four rules follows in any straightforward way from a canonical
principle. Standard of Care, Post-Trial Access and Ancillary Care each require that a
certain kind of benefit (or chance of benefit) be bestowed on research subjects. Sim-
ilarly, Responsiveness requires that a chance of a certain kind of benefit be bestowed
on the country that hosts the study—namely, the production of useful knowledge re-
garding a health condition that is a priority in that country.These requirements that are
truly bizarre from the perspective of the Principle of Beneficence, which underwrites a
concern only for the amount of benefit conferred as opposed to the kind.14
Second, the basic principles underlying each of the four rules are ones that we ob-
viously reject when applied to other domains of human activity. Take for instance, the
domain of employment.15 Suppose there were a factory in Jamaica producing heavy
winter coats. Those who own and run that factory might be guilty of no wrongdoing
at all, despite their violating the analogues of each of the four rules. For instance, the
factory wouldn’t be responsive; Jamaicans have no need for heavy winter coats. And
they probably wouldn’t reward their workers with some of the winter coats they’ve
produced, thus running afoul of the analogue of Post-Trial Access). By contrast, it’s
not clear that we would reject Overall Benefit as applied to other domains of life. Ad-
mittedly, it’s not clear that we accept it either. We consider employment contracts
valid even when we think that the worker isn’t receiving enough money and benefits
to compensate for whatever might be bad about having to do the work. But this might
not be because we deny the Overall Benefit rule as applied to employment. Rather, it
might simply reflect a sensible reluctance on our part to enforce our judgments about
what’s good for other people. Some of the facts about what constitutes well-being for
an individual are contingent on her tastes, values, the commitments she has made, etc.
Therefore, it seems that the enforcement of an Overall Benefit rule in the domain of
employment, in order to be carried out accurately, would require drastic intrusion into
individuals’ personal lives. Itmight well causemore harm than good. (Talk about a case
of bad side-effects of rule-promulgation!) So our refusal to enforce an Overall Benefit
rule in the domain of employment says little if anything about our acceptance of the
ethical claim behind the rule.
As to the fourth move, I admit that it would be controversial. Peter Singer has
argued that what ethical rules we should promulgate does depend on the potential
consequences of their promulgation. Troublingly, Wertheimer makes note of this
with apparent approval.16 But nothing else Wertheimer says commits him to agree-
ing with Singer. Granted, it would be inconsistent for a consequentialist to deny what
Singer says, but Wertheimer is not a consequentialist (remember, he endorses pro-
mulgating Informed Consent, without concerning himself with the question of what
14 The argument of this paragraph draws on Benjamin Sachs,Going from Principles to Rules in Research Ethics, 25
BIOETHICS 9 (2011).
15 Here, I draw on the argument I made in Benjamin Sachs,TheExceptional Ethics of the Investigator-Subject Rela-
tionship, 35 J. MED. PHILOS. 64 (2010).
16 Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 24.
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Two kinds of rule regulating human subjects research  7
consequences that might bring), so no such pressure applies to him. One might try
to back Wertheimer into a corner by suggesting that surely the consequences of pro-
mulgationmatter any time the rule in question is motivated by consideration of conse-
quences, as is the case with Overall Benefit. Notice, however, that Overall Benefit is
motivated by consideration of the consequences for people who serve as research
subjects. So if promulgating Overall Benefit could be shown to have negative con-
sequences specifically for people who serve as research subjects then, yes, even a
non-consequentialist would be under considerable pressure, from considerations of
consistency, to concede that he shouldn’t promulgate it. But it’s hard to see how that
might be shown.
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